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Introduction
Klaas Landsman, Ellen van Wolde and Noortje ter Berg
Das Gewebe dieser Welt ist aus Notwendigkeit und Zufall gebildet
(The fabric of reality is built from necessity and chance)
Goethe
Abstract This chapter introduces the theme of the book (i.e., the challenge of
chance) and includes brief surveys of the individual chapters.
The collapse of cohesion is one of the features that characterize chance. By sheer
accident, or so it seems, something breaks the typical regularity of the natural
world, like a comet disrupting the solar system. At a human scale, we ﬁnd examples
like unexpectedly bumping into an old friend, or losing a loved one in an accident.
Such (seemingly) random phenomena appear arbitrary; they disrupt our lives and
frustrate our human need for logic and meaning. The ensuing feelings of uncer-
tainty and apprehensiveness, in turn, trigger us to search for explanations that will
help restore order and normal patterns of cause and effect. In a word, we are
challenged by chance, and we have been so at least since antiquity.
How do we respond to such challenges? For thousands of years people have tried
to decide whether chance is a fundamental and irreducible phenomenon, i.e. certain
events are not caused—they just happen, or whether chance is merely a reflection of
our ignorance. Either way, we ﬁnd the experience of chance hard to deal with.
Humans constantly try to understand random phenomena and prefer explanations
that (re)install meaning. The question, then, is whether this search for explanation
and meaning has succeeded, or, at least, has a ﬁghting chance (sic) to succeed.
This question is more subtle than it appears, since with his revolutionary claim
that the universe is necessarily the way it is and yet has no goal, Spinoza cut the
thread connecting explanation and purpose. Even necessity was subsequently
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challenged by Darwin’s theory of evolution in the 19th century, followed by
quantum theory in the 20th, in both of which chance plays a fundamental role.
Insult following injury, from Hume and Kant onwards even the causal patterns that
permeate traditional science began to be questioned. From Aristotle to the 18th
century, natural philosophy had seen these patterns as real, our role being limited to
discovering them. Now, however, causality was claimed to be a mere by-product of
our subjective need for rules, patterns, and meaning, which eventually led Bertrand
Russell to his witticism that causality is “a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the
monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm.”
The overall picture was summarized by the chilling words of Physics Nobel
Laureate and popular science writer Steven Weinberg: “The more the universe
appears comprehensible, the more it also appears pointless.” However, he imme-
diately qualiﬁed this pessimistic view (quoted from his popular account of the Big
Bang entitled The First Three Minutes) in the following way: “But if there is no
solace in the fruits of our research, there is at least some consolation in the research
itself. Men and women are not content to comfort themselves with tales of gods and
giants, or to conﬁne their thoughts to the daily affairs of life; they also build
telescopes and satellites and accelerators, and sit at their desks for endless hours
working out the meaning of the data they gather. The effort to understand the
universe is one of the very few things that lifts human life a little above the level of
farce, and gives it some of the grace of tragedy.”
This effort to understand includes the present book, which complements the
excellent interdisciplinary books on chance that have already appeared over the last
decades, both at a scholarly1 and a popular2 level. By incorporating a wide range of
historical and contemporary sciences, the studies presented here allow us to develop
a transdisciplinary perspective on chance. Thus our multidisciplinary approach, in
which a team of authors explores the issue of chance in the disciplines of philos-
ophy, mathematics, economics, game theory, statistics, physics, theology, neu-
ropsychology, genetics, ecology, history, law, and linguistics, makes us aware of
shared insights in these distinct disciplines. Let us ﬁrst give a short survey of the
articles originating in these various disciplines, to conclude with a few thoughts
towards a transdisciplinary perspective on chance.
1See, for example, G. Gigerenzer et al. (eds.), The Empire of Chance (Cambridge University Press,
1989), L. Krüger et al., The Probabilistic Revolution, Vols. 1, 2 (MIT Press, 1990), I. Hacking,
The Taming of Chance (Cambridge University Press, 1990), I. Hacking, The Emergence of
Probability (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed. 2006), S. Kern, A Cultural History of Causality
(Princeton University Press, 2004), P. Vogt, Kontingenz und Zufall: eine Ideen- und
Begriffgeschichte (Akademie-Verlag, 2011).
2E.g., N.N. Taleb, Fooled by Randomness (Penguin, 2004), W. Poundstone, Fortune’s Formula
(HIll and Wang, 2005), K. Mainzer, Der kreative Zufall (C.H. Beck, 2007), N. Silver, The Signal
and the Noise: The Art and Science of Prediction (Penguin, 2012), D. Hand, The Improbability
Principle (Bantam Press, 2014).
2 K. Landsman et al.
1 Contents of This Book: Addressing the Challenge
The opening chapter by Lüthy and Palmerino presents a survey of 2500 years of
linguistic, philosophical, and scientiﬁc reflections on chance, coincidence, fortune,
randomness, luck and other related concepts. In particular, they show that any
concept of chance could only be understood through the alternative that the par-
ticular notion of chance attempted to exclude. And precisely because the alternative
that was to be excluded did not have a stable identity, also its anti-pole (i.e. the idea
of what chance is) had a variable meaning. For example, ‘chance’ has been opposed
to ‘fate’, ‘providence’, ‘natural laws’, ‘determinism,’ and ‘the knowledge of cau-
ses’. This heterogeneous list illustrates what a slippery concept ‘chance’ really is.
The endeavour to pin down and deﬁne concepts by contrasting with opposites is a
thread that runs throughout this book.
Perhaps the most rigorous way to analyse chance is through pure mathematics.
In Terwijn’s chapter we are told that even the best efforts in the 20th century to
capture randomness mathematically have yielded no single ‘true’ notion of ran-
domness.” Instead, a number of (equivalent) deﬁnitions have been proposed that
contextualize randomness relative to prior notions such as computability.
Accordingly, an object is deﬁned as random if its description cannot be shortened in
a computable way, that is, randomness is opposed to computable compressibility.
For example, according to this deﬁnition, despite the completely irregular distri-
bution of its inﬁnitely many digits the number π = 3.14… is not random at all, since
instead of giving all these digits we could write a short program to compute them.
On the other hand, most real numbers are random in this sense, although, curiously,
this fact cannot be proven for any given random number.
Historically, the ﬁrst application of mathematics to chance was to betting and
gambling. Unexpectedly, two centuries later similar methods turned out to lie at the
heart of game theory in economics (Weitzel and Rosenkranz). In ﬁnance, one
typically assumes complete rationality on the part of all actors. In combination with
the ‘efﬁcient market hypothesis’, this would naively seem to imply a deterministic
course of events. However, one of the remarkable predictions of game theory is that
even on these assumptions the most rational strategy is often a random mixture of a
number of alternative possibilities. Of course, this again blurs the alleged demar-
cation between determinism and chance.
Moving from probability to statistics, Goeman describes how researchers in
medical statistics and psychology look for statistical correlations between data in
the hope of revealing (publishable) evidence of a chain of cause and effect (for
example, to conclude or predict that drinking milk is healthy whereas smoking is
not). In a word, statistics is used to ‘negotiate’ chance. However, as Goeman
argues, even ignoring notorious (especially Dutch) cases of scientiﬁc fraud, esti-
mates of the unreliability of serious and published clinical studies range from 14 to
89 %, and he makes several proposals to improve this situation.
In the next chapter, Landsman’s analysis of the ‘ﬁne-tuning argument’ bridges
the gap between chance in mathematics and physics on the one hand and chance in
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philosophy and theology on the other. The laws of nature contain parameters that
are set at highly speciﬁc values for the universe to exist, and for us, humans, to exist
in it. The list of possible explanations for this ﬁne-tuning of the universe includes:
design by a deity, a ‘multi-verse’ (so as to increase the probability of the existence
of our own universe), ‘blind chance’, and ﬁnally, ‘blind necessity’. For Landsman
the latter two are the best options but he adds: “The present state of science does not
allow us to make such a choice now, and the question even arises whether science
will ever be able to make it, except perhaps philosophically.”
Contrary to common belief, theological stances from the past were not all
deterministic. In the Hebrew Bible, for instance, the book of Job describes the
dramatic alternation between fortune and misfortune in a non-deterministic way, as
Van Wolde’s analysis shows. Job is unaware that God is carrying out an experiment
because of a wager with the satan. Job tries to ﬁnd his own explanations and
reasons, but is chastised by God for obscuring “the design by words without
knowledge”. God’s dismissive words reverberate throughout the years of thinking
about chance, coincidence, luck, randomness and such concepts. Are these just
words without knowledge? Or is it our historical, spatial, and cultural perspective
that limits our type of rationality? Van Wolde also discusses this question with
respect to the ﬁrst chapter of the book of Genesis, which for many people, secular
or non-secular, is the clearest example of God initiating a cause-driven chain of
events. The question, then, is whether this is really the case.
It is a relatively small step from the ancient Near-East to the ancient Greek and
Asian worlds. Bringing both philosophical and Buddhist attitudes towards chance
into the picture, Thijssen and Loy point out that at ﬁrst, ‘luck’ (or ‘chance’) and
‘karma’ seem to be opposing concepts. If something happens because of good or
bad luck, it is beyond the agent’s control whereas, in contrast, karma, implies that
agents have a great deal of control (albeit indirect) over what happens. However,
both philosophical traditions believe that being invulnerable to bad luck depends
upon mental transformation. Western traditions focus more on coping with the
emotional effects of bad luck, whereas Eastern traditions concentrate on the agent’s
motivations. But both aim to change our experience of the world and are still
helpful today in our attempts to secure happiness in the face of adversity.
In contrast, the contemporary western approach to chance as an aspect of human
life is set in the framework of cognitive neuroscience. van Elk, Friston, and
Bekkering discuss the deeply engrained human tendency to give meaning to
coincidences. However, it turns out that not only are humans remarkably bad at
estimating chances and probabilities, they also tend to perceive a causal nexus
between situations even where there is none. In doing so, the original meaning of
coincidence is subverted, as it gestures at a perceived connection between events
even though we cannot explain the causal mechanism behind it. Following
Helmholtz, they argue that the human brain a priori constructs a predictive model of
the world, which however may be interrupted or distracted by seemingly random
events (neuroscientists typically have a deterministic world picture, so that ran-
domness is never absolute but is only experienced as such). However, it is their
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very randomness that endows such events with at least subjective explanatory
power, in that the brain may conclude that the inexplicable becomes explicable,
precisely because it was random.
Medical research has to bridge another chasm, namely from biology and genetics
to the feelings of loss when a handicapped child is born ‘by chance’ to healthy
parents. Brunner shows in his study that random genetic mutations that originate at
the molecular level can subsequently have either causal or probabilistic conse-
quences for genes, individuals, species, ecosystems, and eventually even for the
planet. The example of genetics also raises the question whether random events are
beneﬁcial or harmful: on the one hand, random errors of replication during the
formation of germ cells can cause birth defects that result in a miscarriage or severe
problems for the child and parents. On the other hand, such mutations drive evo-
lution at the level of the species, typically enabling it to improve.
Coincidence also plays a central role in De Kroon and Jongejans’ chapter. They
counter the statement that “if it’s a coincidence, it is not scientiﬁc”—a judgment
implied in the premises of the previous two chapters. They argue that if ‘chance
processes’ such as a heavy storm occur at the right place and time they could well
determine the development of ecosystems and they claim “chance is pervasive in
ecological systems.” But what is the status of chance here? Qualifying their thesis,
the authors argue that chance events typically have a deterministic origin, and that
the stochastic nature of their occurrences can often be deﬁned within a range of
predictable variation. What remains problematic is the uneasy relationship between
the scale-dependence of cause and effect with that of stochasticity.
In his chapter, Hekster tells us that because coincidences are, by deﬁnition, not
causally related, traditional historians have tended to ignore them. So when is a
coincidence just a coincidence, and when does a pattern occur? And why would a
historian be interested in ‘accidents’, ‘singular events’, or ‘contingent circum-
stances’? Surely, it has been historically decisive that Hitler survived all attempts to
kill him (except his own). Yet it is tempting to walk the path of ‘what-if history’.
But does counterfactual thinking liberate us from a false sense of historical deter-
minism or does it, instead, lead to a view of history as a series of random events?
The answer to this question depends entirely on one’s sense of the causal forces
active in history. A providentialist or determinist will see inevitabilities and
necessities. As Hekster argues, much will also depend on how one deﬁnes “the
intersection between private actions and the public world,” where “history devel-
ops.” At those intersections, coincidences might play an explanatory role, but only
if understood in terms of micro-causes related to individual human agency.
In Jansen’s article, which deals with ‘accidental harm’ under Roman law (which
has exerted a paramount influence on modern European Law), we once more
encounter the Latin word ‘casus’ with its many meanings, which signiﬁes not just
‘accident’, but also ‘misfortune’, ‘fate’, ‘adversity’ or ‘setback,’ which, in the legal
context, all amount “to an event resulting in damage which cannot be traced back to
another party’s fault.” For the Roman lawyer, however, ‘casus’ is not opposed to
necessity, but to some state of intentionality. In any case, accidents are seen as
purely negative, and the question is simply who is liable for the damage they cause.
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Yet at least in Western Europe, after WW II this principle was increasingly
countered by the tendency of governments to protect citizens from misfortune,
notably by means of a social security system—“from womb to tomb” (Churchill).
In recent years such systems seem to be weakening, partly for ﬁnancial reasons
(they are arguably becoming unaffordable), but also under the influence of liberal
tendencies to restore the individual’s responsibility for whatever happens to him or
her.
The chapter by Van Hout and Muysken starts with a rejection of complete
generative models of linguistics à la Chomsky, in which chance hardly plays any
role and at best represents a lack of knowledge. Instead, they use numerous
examples to show that chance, in the sense of language variation, plays a major role
at each of the four levels of linguistics: inter-species variability, inter-language
variability, variability in the linguistic signal within a given language, and ﬁnally
inter-individual variability. In each of these four levels, the notion of chance ﬁgures
as an inherent property; it is a probability mechanism to explain variability. They
conclude the ﬁnal chapter of this book with the comment that random variations in
language ultimately originate from the fact that human ways of expressing meaning
are far from unique.
2 A Transdisciplinary Perspective on Chance
One of the insights of this collection of articles that struck us as meaningful when
looking at chance from such diverse disciplinary perspectives is that two aspects
return in many of the contributions, namely the contextuality of chance and its role
in explanations.
Contextuality of chance is most clearly seen in scale-dependence, which is found
in many biological ecosystems (cf. De Kroon and Jongejans). What seem to be
random events at a lower level can produce stability at a higher level. For example,
seeds are dispersed at random by the wind, then may germinate into a plant or
disappear. Another example is the origins of language variation. Ideas about ran-
dom origins will be different if studied at the level of species, language in general,
different languages, or individual speakers of a given language (Van Hout and
Muysken). Random genetic mutations (Brunner) provide yet another case in point.
They originate at a molecular level but, subsequently, have causal or probabilistic
consequences for genes, individuals, species, ecosystems and thus, ultimately, for
the planet as a whole. In history, what seem to be a small-scale state of affairs (such
as the legendary beauty of Cleopatra’s nose) can have huge consequences for
nations and even epochs (Hekster). As a ﬁnal example, in economics, the (random)
individual psychology of a single investor interacts with the rather more deter-
ministic psychology of the ‘masses’, for example, during the tulip mania in 1637 or
the dotcom bubble in the 1990s (Weitzel and Rosenkranz).
Another instance of the contextuality of chance is its perspectival nature. In
mathematics (Terwijn), no absolute notion of randomness can exist, and in order to
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properly deﬁne the notion, one has to specify with respect to what the supposed
random objects should be random. Thus a random object is random with respect to
a given type of deﬁnition, or class of sets. Strikingly, this view is comparable to the
theological view presented in literary form in the biblical book of Job (Van Wolde).
In the narrated divine speech out of the whirlwind, chance is related to a multifocal
view of a universe and interpreted in terms of perspective: God, reflecting on the
universe and its inhabitants, states that he does not share the perspective of the stars,
weather phenomena, or animals, and that he does not even share the moral con-
victions of human beings who only want him to share their perspective, such as
their ideas of justice. Thus what seems to be coincidental at the level of humans (or
animals and plants) may be the effect of order at a higher level.
Secondly, throughout history including contemporary science, chance has been
used both as an explanation and as the hallmark of an absence of explanation. Thus
one may wonder if these apparent antipodes are really as antithetical as they seem.
Historiography itself is a prime example. One could argue that Western philosophy
would have emerged without Plato, or that there would have been a Scientiﬁc
Revolution without Newton. But would there have been a communist Russian
Revolution without Lenin, or a Holocaust without Hitler? If not, the actual occur-
rence of these momentous events in history was eventually caused by the random
events of the births of these particular individuals. Similarly, parents with a severely
handicapped or stillborn child may feel that their misfortune has no explanation,
while their doctor may say it was caused by a random genetic defect. Appeals to God
as the instigator of certain random events play a similar role. In quantum physics it
could be claimed that radio-active atoms decay because of random events, or it could
be said that this decay cannot be explained. The Fine-Tuning Argument brings this
dual role of chance to a head, as many contemporary secular scientists seem perfectly
happy to attribute the occurrence of life to chance, whereas others regard this as the
lack of an ‘explanation’, and look elsewhere.
The reader is invited to also look at other chapters from these two angles, or
indeed from any angle he or she prefers, as chance is an inﬁnitely rich phenomenon
that will continue to fascinate humans as long they live. We hope this book will
challenge our readers as much as it did the authors.
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